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Synopsis  
 
As a growing global threat, cyber-attacks can cost 
millions of dollars or endanger national stability 
and human lives.  While relatively well understood 
in most sectors, it is becoming clear that, although 
the maritime sector is becoming more digitally 
advanced (e.g., autonomy), it is not well protected 
against cyber or cyber-physical attacks and 
accidents. To help improve sector-wide safety and 
resiliency, the University of Plymouth (UoP) is 
creating a specialised maritime-cyber lab, which 
combines maritime technology and traditional 
cyber-security labs.  This is in response to the lack 
of research and mitigation capabilities and will 
create a new resource capability for academia, 
government, and industry research into maritime 
cybersecurity risks and threats. These lab 
capabilities will also enhance existing maritime-
cyber capabilities across the world, including risk 
assessment frameworks, cybersecurity ranges/labs, 
ship simulators, mariner training programmes, 
autonomous ships, etc.  The goal of this paper is to 
explain the need for next generation maritime-
cyber research capabilities, and demonstrate how 
something like the proposed Cyber-SHIP Lab 
(Hardware, Software, Information and Protections) 
will help industry, government, and academia 
understand and mitigate cyber threats in the 
maritime sector.  The authors believe a next 
generation cyber-secure lab should host a range of 
real, non-simulated, maritime systems.  With 
multiple configurations to mirror existing bridge 
system set-ups, the technology can be studied for 
individual system weakness as well as the system-
of-systems vulnerabilities. Such as lab would 
support a range of research that cannot be achieved 
with simulators alone and help support the next 
generation of cyber-secure marine systems.   
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1. Introduction 
As of 2019, the global implementation of robust 
maritime cyber-security policy is essentially non-
existent. One of the first analysis of the sector’s 
maritime-cyber security capabilities was in 2013 
when the EU reported that there was an 
international lack of maritime cyber-security 
awareness, and that existing protocols catered to 
purely physical aspects of security and safety 
(ENSIA 2011).  Since then several generic cyber-
hygiene articles have been published to address 
rising concern in companies and international 
organisations like the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO 2018). However, generic 
cyber-hygiene is insufficient for robust security. 
Moreover, existing cyber solutions fit poorly with 
the maritime-specific issues and the growth of 
technology continues to introduce new risks.  With 
this growing threat, it is clear that there is a lack of 
the capability to fully analyse and mitigate the 
growing number of maritime-cyber risks. 
One of the challenges to fully understanding and 
mitigating maritime cyber risks is the bespoke 
nature of the equipment.  The range of ship types, 
sizes, and ages in the global fleet mean that the 
diversity of equipment configuration from ship-to-
ship can vary greatly.  This makes maritime cyber 
more difficult to understand, because common 
analysis and risk assessment tools cannot just be re-
applied to a new context.  As these systems are also 
connected in unique configurations, with both 
Information Technology and Operational 
Technology (IT/OT) working in the same 
environment, understanding and securing the 
system-of-systems is also difficult.  Just as security 
is different between rail and air, even though both 
transportation sectors rely on similar systems, 
maritime needs its own dedicated research 
capabilities. One unique aspect of maritime cyber 
security is the blend of IT and OT.  The bulk of 
security efforts is normally focussed on IT, but as 
there are many physical operations in maritime 
(e.g., propulsion, cargo movement) OT needs to be 
considered as well.  This is why the University of 
Plymouth is creating research capabilities to 
consider the physical aspects as well as the digital, 
hence a lab that is accurate to the hardware level 
and not a simulation or emulation. Unfortunately, it 
is also not easy for those outside the maritime 
community to contribute to maritime cyber 
research.  Data is difficult to acquire, and the 
equipment necessary is much more expensive than 
more traditional security labs.  Given this, the 
problems the University of Plymouth aims to 
address by creating the Cyber-SHIP lab are: 
 Risk assessment/management of maritime cyber 
threats (cyber, and cyber-physical) 
 Find/fix vulnerabilities from hardware, 
software, and human-computer interactions 
 Work with stakeholders to improve resiliency 
and cyber-safety of individual systems  
 Analyse the cybersecurity of a collection of 
bridge systems, connected in real world 
configurations 
 Discover maritime-cyber threats that can be 
used to educate future mariners and Navies 
 Determine future cyber threats to assets, 
economy, human lives, and environment. 
 
The rest of the paper is as follows, Section 2 
describes existing tools and practices (e.g., why 
simulations are not sufficient for maritime-cyber 
research), evolving technology trends and state-
level threats. Section 3 uses the background to 
explain why the maritime sector needs next 
generation maritime-cyber research capabilities, 
and how the University of Plymouth is creating that 
capability.  Section 4 describes future work to be 
done, to work with other organisations to 
understand and reduce cybersecurity threats in 
maritime and Section 5 concludes the article. 
2. Background 
Many organisations rely on maritime operations. In 
terms of volume, maritime trade and passengers 
accounts for 90% of all worldwide transportation 
(ICS 2018).  Other important functions include 
military activity (i.e., Navy). Both of which are 
essential to a modern countries’ national 
infrastructure, safety, and economy.  This section 
looks at current tools and practices for researching 
maritime-cyber threats and training individuals to 
mitigate the threats.  Next, it will discuss the 
current technological and cyber-risks trends along 
with the human element of cyber-threats.  Once 
these have been, established Section 3 will discuss 
next generation research and training capabilities 
to meet these growing maritime-cyber threats. 
2.1 Existing Tools and Practices 
Training and research facilities can be categorized 
by whether they primarily use simulation, 
emulation, or the in-situ systems used (see Table 1). 
2.1.1 Simulations and Training 
Many universities and organisations use 
sophisticated simulators today with a focus on 
training. In technical terms, simulation is the 
replication of general system behaviours using a 
conceptual model. The benefit of simulators is that, 
when set up correctly, they provide near-real 
experiences for training without all the hazards of 
the real world. Currently the ratio of real world to 
simulation training is skewed toward more 
simulation time, mirroring aviation, which is about 
1:30 to 1:15 real training to simulation time 
(Salman 2013).  However, simulators are limited to 
their programming and have made it difficult to 
simulate cyber-attacks for new cyber-aspects of 
training or maritime-cyber research (Moorthy et al. 
2005).  While simulators can be continuously made 
more realistic, the increased cost lowers the appeal 
of simulators for research purposes.  Other purposes 
for simulations, such as the “digital twin”, are 
relatively new and in-development, and will be 
discussed further in the following subsection. 
2.1.2 Emulation and Cyber-Ranges 
Globally there has been an increase in cyber-
ranges, or cybersecurity labs, which are computer 
labs designed specifically to handle the research of 
dangerous software (e.g., viruses, malware).  There 
are a number of these ranges/labs in several 
countries, commercially, academically, and for 
military purposes (Davis and Magrath 2013).   
Majority of these use simulation or emulation. 
Unlike the software simulation of a few system 
model behaviours, emulation replicates one system 
in another more faithfully.  It has been found that 
emulation, and cyber-ranges that use emulation, 
tend to be more useful for training and research.  
That said the common downfall of emulation is that 
the added infrastructure and abilities cost more 
(Davis and Magrath 2013).  
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 Costly 
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realistic 
 Real world 
consequences 
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Table 1: Strengths & weaknesses of different 
approaches for maritime training and research 
 
Additionally, for maritime, one downside of cyber-
ranges is their almost exclusive view on 
information technology, with little to no focus on 
operational technology.  While emulation can be 
semi-realistic, it cannot achieve total realism.  This 
is troublesome when connecting multiple systems 
together as they may not be able to communicate 
(e.g., not timing-accurate) (Griffin et al. 2002).  A 
significant benefit of the Cyber-SHIP is it can study 
connected systems, as well as individual ones.  
2.1.3 Real World (in-situ) Systems 
To test real world systems (but not simulation or 
emulation), security-based penetration testing can 
be highly useful for research. Real systems also 
provide the most realistic training possible for 
learners. However, particularly in maritime, if a 
mistake is made with the real equipment, a lot of 
physical and technical damage could be caused  
(Allianz 2019; Lewis 2002).  Ships could collide 
with sandbars and crucial shipping data can be 
leaked.  This is why, traditionally, simulation has 
been used for structured human training and either 
simulation or emulation has been used for research.  
Conversely, pen-testing has mainly been used for 
quality assurance and information risk mitigation  
(Arkin et al. 2005; Calder and Watkins 2010). 
The increase of cybersecurity threats in the digital 
age means that the maritime sector needs new 
research capabilities to maintain safety standards.  
This is why the authors propose a next generation 
maritime-cyber research capability, which 
combines cyber-ranges with real maritime 
equipment, specifically those found on a ship’s 
bridge.  This is to provide researchers with the 
benefits of real-world equipment, but adding safety 
and experiment capabilities with minimal, 
strategic, uses of emulation and simulation.  This is 
also intended to start as a specialised facility 
catering to the maritime sector, a niche no one is 
currently filling in this way.  Using real hardware 
and software in a cyber-secure lab environment 
will enable many research opportunities, leading to 
updated training (see Table 1).   
2.2 Evolving Technology 
With the arrival of the digital age, systems are 
becoming more sophisticated and more connected.  
A short summary of some key technological 
developments for the maritime sector is provided, 
as describing the future digital trends for maritime 
is meant to provide context to why next generation 
research capability is needed.  References to more 
detailed research will be provided for those 
interested in further detail. Given these trends and 
the current capabilities, the authors illustrate how 
maritime-cyber threats will keep growing. 
 
2.2.1 Digital Twin and Virtual Reality 
The use of simulation in the maritime sector is 
shifting away from primarily training to other 
purposes.  The digital twin concept (Tao, et al., 
2018) uses simulation to re-create a real ship 
digitally to aid ship design, construction, and 
monitor performance.  While this may have major 
advantages on researching efficiency and a ship’s 
lifecycle, it is less relevant for cybersecurity.  
Augmented reality and fully virtual realities also 
use simulation (Tam & Jones 2019c). Unlike full 
virtual reality, augmented reality has both real and 
virtual elements.  In maritime, this has been 
proposed to provide more information for local or 
remote crews to control ship systems (Baldauf and 
Procee 2014; Frydenberg et al. 2018).  As this 
blends new technology with human-in-the-loop 
decisions and actions, the Cyber-SHIP lab would be 
one possible facility to study cyber vulnerabilities 
that could lead to false or malicious, information 
being provided to human crew and the potential 
outcomes from those kinds of attacks. 
2.2.2 Internet-of-Things 
The concept of the IoT (Internet-of-Things) is that 
many devices communicate significant amounts of 
data via the Internet.  As that definition is broad, IoT 
networks can be massive.  This is true of maritime 
devices as well.  As computing power becomes 
cheaper and devices more useful and durable, more 
personal devices are being used and more ship/port 
specific devices are being connected (Cankar and 
Stanovik 2018; Ha et al. 2018; Pizzo et al. 2018; 
Tam and Jones 2019b). One of the strengths of the 
proposed Cyber-SHIP Lab, and the fact that it uses 
real systems, is its ability to study connected 
systems, either IoT or more traditional networks.  
This would be a new capability that previous 
simulation and emulation methods have not 
achieved, for this level of cyber-related research. 
2.2.3 Autonomous 
In some ways, autonomous ships and ports are built 
on top of IoT technology, as the autonomy requires 
more digital monitoring (e.g., more sensors), 
increasing the number of possible cyber 
vulnerabilities (Tam and Jones 2018).  Therefore, 
again, analysing the communications between 
computing systems is critical for next generation 
research capabilities.  The main difference between 
autonomous and IoT is that more than Internet-
based networks may be used (Zolich et al. 2019). 
Unlike IoT, future research into autonomous ships 
and ports will have to study the cyber-physical 
threats more, as more of the devices connected will 
be used for physical operations as well (e.g., 
navigation, propulsion, cargo management) instead 
of primarily for monitoring and sharing data.  Semi-
autonomous technology may also use virtual 
reality, as described earlier in Section 2.2.1. 
2.2.4 IT/OT convergence 
Lastly, there has been a trend of converging IT and 
OT, particularly in maritime.  This follows the 
general trend observed in other topics of systems 
becoming more connected.  IT/OT convergence, 
however, is a little different, as there are more 
operational system involved, increasing the number 
of cyber-physical vulnerabilities and threats 
possible (Man et al. 2018).  As this and the other 
digital trends in this section show, maritime cyber 
threats are growing and evolving with technology 
itself and how the technology is used.  Of the four 
digital trends presented, the OT aspect will likely 
require the most emulation when researching 
maritime cybersecurity of IT/OT systems. 
As discussed in this paper, current research and 
teaching facilities would struggle to accommodate 
to these digital trends, as facilities are not set up to 
accommodate for multiple connected systems, 
especially IT and OT systems together.   
2.3. Cyber Threats 
The body of work on general cyber threats is vast; 
in contrast, maritime cyber threats are not as well 
defined.  This section is not an exhaustive study, 
but instead discusses some of the most relevant 
studies relating to cyber threats in maritime across 
industry and military. Cyber-attacks can have 
many outcomes, cyber (e.g., data theft), physical 
(e.g., collision, real theft), financial (e.g. loss of 
customer data, delays in shipment) and more.  
Attacks can also be fast, with computers an attack 
can happen in less than a second, or be long lasting.  
For example, spying or loss of intellectual property 
data can affect short-term and long-term 
competitiveness of businesses and cause national 
security problems if leaks occurred during 
government or military espionage incidents (Choo 
2011).  There are also many types of human threats 
from pranksters to terrorists (BIMCO 2016; Tam 
and Jones, 2019b).  In maritime most cyber-related 
incidences so far seem to have been accidental  
rather than attacks (Maersk 2017; Rajamanickam 
2018); however, recent attack by state-actors have 
also shown that the military must be ready for a 
number of cyber-attacks on maritime vessels and 
infrastructure (C4ADS 2019; Climpanu 2019).     
3. Next Generation Research Capabilities 
Many rely on maritime operations across industry, 
military, and academia; therefore, there are many 
facilities for researching and teaching globally.  
Earlier sections have demonstrated (1) the rising 
cyber-security threat (2) digital age vulnerabilities 
and (3) the limitations of current capabilities.  In 
this section the authors describe the current 
capabilities at the University of Plymouth with 
respect to maritime and cyber, and then describe 
the proposed Cyber-SHIP Lab as a next generation 
research capability for cybersecurity in maritime.  
Figure 1: Overview of Research Capabilities with the proposed Cyber-SHIP Lab 
 
3.1 Current UoP Capabilities 
This section does not describe the UoP simulators 
and cyber-range, as they are currently standard (see 
Section 2.1).  This section discusses several unique 
maritime-cyber facilities at the university. This 
includes the Plymouth Smart Sound and Maritime 
Cyber Risk Assessment (MaCRA) framework and 
how they will work with Cyber-SHIP to provide 
new research capabilities together.   
3.1.1 Smart Sound  
Smart Sound Plymouth is a proving area for 
designing, testing and developing cutting-edge 
products and services for the advanced marine 
sector. Covering over 1,000km2 of ocean off 
Plymouth Sound, the proving area’s impressive 
variety of water depth, sea states and weather 
conditions is ideally suited for conducting sea trials, 
including sub-sea tests with access to offshore 
water depths of 75m.  The University of Plymouth 
has partnered with the Marine Business Technology 
Centre (MBTC), and others, pooling a number of 
physical assets to aid technological development.  
For example, UoP is providing access to its 
unmanned surface vessels, shown in Figure 1.  
Smart Sound Plymouth is ideally suited for building 
and supporting the next generation of marine 
technologies. Since it is dangerous to do cyber-
research in open waters, possibly affecting other 
ships, most of the dangerous research can be done 
in the Cyber-SHIP.  Experiments that pass safety 
standards in the lab can then be repeated in the real, 
but safely controlled and fully instrumented (e.g., 
monitored), smart sound environment.  
3.1.2 MaCRA  
This maritime cyber risk assessment framework has 
been designed specifically to quantify and prioritise 
cyber risks in maritime.  The MaCRA framework 
inputs data on system vulnerabilities, potential 
outcomes, as well as attacker abilities and target 
defences (Tam and Jones 2019b).  It then outputs 
graphical or numerical risk profiles that can be 
customised to the analyst to answer specific or 
broad maritime-cyber risk queries (see Figure 2).  
Connecting MaCRA to the proposed lab would 
increase the framework’s risk profile details, and 
help prioritize threat-mitigation research when 
analysing Cyber-SHIP bridge configurations. 
3.2 New Cyber-SHIP Capabilities 
This section describes the proposed lab in more 
high-level detail, as well as the aim of the lab.  Once 
the next generation lab is established, future work 
will analyse the architecture in full detail. 
3.2.1 Setup 
The establishment of the Plymouth Cyber-SHIP 
(Software, Hardware, Information, and Protection) 
Lab would be a transformational step towards 
developing a new research capability for maritime 
cyber-security. It would also add new capabilities 
to existing facilities (e.g., ship simulators, cyber-
ranges, Smart Sound).  The approach proposed in 
this article addresses a number of complex and 
interlinked issues affecting the maritime industry. 
Both technological and human behavioural aspects 
must be taken into account for effective mitigation 
of threats, as must with the huge variation in vessel 
types, which can be subjected to cyber-attacks in 
different ways for various motivations.  
Understanding and addressing all of these 
parameters is the crux of the innovation in this 
approach. Providing a space where industry, 
military, and academia can pool together resources 
and research efforts would be beneficial toward 
increasing maritime cybersecurity across the sector.  
Moreover, as a non-competitor in the shipping 
market, an academic lab is also in a position to 
begin gathering anonymized data for further 
research ranging from secure military research, to 
public academic research in universities and 
organizations that do not have the means to 
generate this data. To do this, real bridge equipment 
will be gathered in a secure lab, where in-depth 
tools (e.g., pen-testing) can be used to discover and 
analyse cyber vulnerabilities from the hardware, to 
Figure 2: Risk Projections in MaCRA 
 
software, and digital-human interactions.  A secure 
lab would have traditional network protections to 
prevent damage to outside entities, as well unique 
capabilities such as a faraday cage or signal 
simulation to test spoofing and jamming, which can 
be damaging and is illegal outside a secure lab.  
Software tools will also be made for vulnerability 
and risk research and for running experiments.   
The Cyber-SHIP Lab will assemble key equipment 
found on a ship’s bridge to test resilience from a 
systems-of-systems perspective. As mentioned, one 
the downfalls of simulation and emulation is that, 
although individual systems can be re-created, it is 
difficult to then connect these modelled systems as 
most simulations and emulations are not timing-
accurate down to the hardware level.   
By connecting the real hardware together, with 
limited simulation and emulation used to interact 
with the system as a connected whole, the Cyber-
SHIP would be capable of researching more than 
individual systems. This is important in the diverse 
IT/OT maritime environment, but particularly for 
ships, which connects a number of different 
systems.  While the lab is unlikely to be able re-
create every available bridge setup, based on 
international regulations (IMO 2003; IMO 2018), 
the lab should be configurable to most common 
setups.  A variety of examples for each aspect of 
bridge equipment, in rack-based infrastructure, will 
allow rapid and complex configurations to aid 
experimentation as well as match a wide variety of 
real world setups.  
As a shared capability, organisations across 
academia, government, military, and industry 
would also be able to provide, temporarily or in the 
long term, missing systems for their own research 
without needing to invest in their own lab. 
3.2.2 New Cyber-SHIP Aims 
Once assembled, the Cyber-SHIP lab will enable 
new cybersecurity research into individual systems 
and connected systems, from the hardware to 
human user level, enabling the development of 
mitigation measures both technically and for human 
factors perspective. The lab as it stands now will be 
developed and delivered in partnership with key 
partners including equipment manufacturers, 
solution developers, shipping and port operators, 
ship builders, classification agencies, government 
branches (e.g. transport, maritime incidents) and 
insurance companies.  This is to ensure that a 
number of bridge configurations can be achieved 
with a single lab, and demonstrates the wide range 
of interests from different niches in the sector. 
It is important to recognise that, although 
researching maritime cybersecurity is crucial, it is 
not currently an easy area of research.  As maritime 
cyber data is scarce, commercially sensitive, or 
pertains to national security, and the equipment 
necessary to represent shipping environments is 
much more expensive than more traditional security 
labs, it may be overlooked as a research field.  
Providing a space where government industry and 
academia can pool resources and research efforts 
will be of significant benefit to all those involved 
with maritime. While this maritime-cyber lab aims 
to provide next generation research capabilities, it 
is not intended as a stand-alone solution.  As seen 
in Figure 1, the Cyber-SHIP lab is meant to be 
integrated with other existing facilities.  In this case, 
the lab is able to connect to other UoP facilities, 
including its cyber-range and ship’s bridge 
simulator (Figures 3 and 4 respectively).   
A lab like this would also benefit from sharing data 
with risk assessment frameworks for maritime 
operations across the sector, and help facilities 
designated for the future of autonomous ships, 
including drones. Following this is a more in-depth 
discussion on future work regarding the Cyber-
SHIP lab in isolation and with other existing 
capabilities in both maritime and cybersecurity. 
4. Future Work and Limitations 
The largest negative to the Cyber-SHIP Lab 
approach is the cost (see Table 1), both initial and 
updates. It is possible that, as systems update to 
become more cyber-secure and provide better 
forensic data (Tam and Jones, 2019a), this lab may 
be less useful in 20-30 years. However, without 
some next generation research capabilities, it 
would be difficult for systems to become 
sufficiently cyber secure fast enough to meet 
today’s threats and those in the near future.  This is 
the rationale behind Cyber-SHIP.   
Figure 4: UoP ship simulator, main bridge 
 
Figure 3: UoP cyber-range  
 
Once this facility has been established, future work 
can be done to layout the architecture in detail. In 
the future, this lab may branch out to include more 
systems as well (e.g., port).  The lifecycle of the 
proposed lab should mirror a real ship, and if the 
research output was of sufficient quality, an 
updated lab may not be needed.  Future work may 
also take what is learned in such a lab to update 
human training. More technically, future work 
should look at each systems individually (e.g., 
navigation, sensors, IoT devices) and as a part of 
the ship’s system-of-systems for vulnerabilities.  
Future research should also examine human-to-
machine (e.g., augmented reality) interactions 
individually, but also as a whole, particularly as the 
amount of data humans need to process increases.  
The Cyber-SHIP lab will also help developers 
create automated audit/pentesting tools and AI 
solutions for intrusion detection and other 
malicious cyber-activity in systems. 
5. Conclusions 
The Cyber-SHIP Lab is designed to supply next 
generation research capabilities into maritime-
cyber, particularly for analysing hardware, 
software, information, and developing protections.  
Unlike existing research capabilities, the lab 
enables system-of-systems research on connected 
devices, instead of individual systems in isolation. 
Development of Cyber-SHIP is meant to meet 
growing trends in maritime technology and will 
enable ongoing testing and validation of software 
and hardware systems to counter the threat of 
cyber-attacks to industry, government, and 
academia, also by bringing resources together. The 
lab is also designed to enhance current research 
facilities, simulators and cyber-ranges, while 
providing a much-needed capability that neither of 
these can provide for future security needs. 
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